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ABSTRACT
Jupyter has become the go-to platform for developing data applications but data and security concerns, especially
when dealing with healthcare, have become paramount for many institutions and applications dealing with sensitive
information. How then can we continue to enjoy the data analysis and machine learning opportunities provided by
Jupyter and the Python ecosystem while guaranteeing auditable compliance with security and privacy concerns? We
will describe the architecture and implementation of a cloud based platform based on Jupyter that integrates with
Amazon Web Services (AWS) and uses containerized services without exposing the platform to the vulnerabilities
present in Kubernetes and JupyterHub. This architecture addresses the HIPAA requirements to ensure both security
and privacy of data. The architecture uses an AWS service to provide JSON Web Tokens (JWT) for authentication as
well as network control. Furthermore, our architecture enables secure collaboration and sharing of Jupyter notebooks.
Even though our platform is focused on Jupyter notebooks and JupyterLab, it also supports R-Studio and bespoke
applications that share the same authentication mechanisms. Further, the platform can be extended to other cloud
services other than AWS.
Keywords data science, infrastructure, jupyter, rstudio
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Introduction
This paper focuses on secure implementation of Jupyter Notebooks and Jupyter Labs in a cloud based platform and
more specifically on Amazon Web Services (AWS) though many architectures and methods described here are appli-
cable to other cloud platforms.
Project Jupyter includes Jupyter Hub, which provides a proxy and container management. In particular the Zero
to Jupyter Hub with Kubernetes project, [Pro20] provides a framework to implement Jupyter Hub on a Kubernetes
platform but with many significant security drawbacks. Kubernetes is notoriously difficult to secure and has many
vulnerabilities that are not addressed by default.
Security is paramount for applications that process sensitive data in areas such as defense, finance, and healthcare.
Broadly speaking, security regulations can be characterized in terms of authentication (verifying the credentials of
users and their access to resources), encryption (data is encrypted at rest and in transit), auditing (providing surveillance
of key resources) and vulnerability mitigation (antivirus and security updates).
In the architecture section, we describe how our architecture using AWS Elastic Container Service (ECS) facilitates
encryption at-rest and in-transit and integrates an application load balancer (ALB) for authentication.
In the Applications and Authentication section, we dive into the details of the ALB and how JSON Web Tokens (JWT)
facilitate integration with Jupyter and RStudio.
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Figure 1: Cloud Architecture.
In the Security and Compliance section, we address the encryption of the underlying cloud architecture, auditing
capabilities, and mitigation of vulnerabilities.
Our specific implementation satisfies privacy and security concerns and can serve as a starting point to develop cus-
tomized solutions for related use cases.
Architecture
There are two distinct levels of architecture described. The cloud architecture comprises the various cloud services
which is the lower layer of virtualization. The container architecture is the top layer virtualization built on top of the
cloud architecture.
Cloud Architecture
The basic cloud architecture is shown in Fig. 2. It consists of an identity provider (IDP) used to authenticate a user, an
application load balancer (ALB) to regulate user access through authentication, and a fleet of elastic cloud computer
compute (EC2) instances to instantiate the containers. Finally, ECS manages the containers deployed on the EC2
cluster.
Elastic Container Service ECS is a container orchestration service. A container is instantiated as an ECS task. ECS
provides a resource called a task definition that allow for the configuration of the container image, the environment
variables, command override and container port.
Taking the most naive approach, ECS can be instructed to start a task based on a task definition. After the task has
fully started, the host among the EC2 instances and the mapped port (the port on the EC2 node which is mapped to
the container port) is known. At this point, one could write a monitoring function to detect when a task has started,
retrieve the specific host and mapped port and create a listener rule for the application load balancer.
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Instead of this cumbersome procedure, ECS provides another resource called a service. A service can manage many
aspects of tasks within ECS including the number of tasks and a target group associated with the service. For our
purposes managing the number means selecting a desired count of 1 or 0 depending on whether the container is
running or has been automatically culled due to inactivity. A target group is a collection of host ports or serverless
AWS Lambda functions, to which a listener rule can direct network traffic. In short by specifying a target group to a
service, the host and mapped port are automatically assigned to the target group when a task has fully started.
Application Load Balancer AWS’s ALB can comprise multiple listeners to support multiple protocols. To maintain
security, enforcement of HTTPS should be maintained either by not including a listener for HTTP or providing an
HTTP listener that redirects all requests to HTTPS.
AWS’s ALB, through a listener, is able to direct external HTTPS requests to various components. Based on lis-
tener rules, a request can be directed on the basis of both the hostname and the path. As an example, we use
a path to specify a user and a service such as Jupyter (for example, domain.com/user_id/Jupyter or
domain.com/user_id/rstudio), this allows us to give each user their own container.
Each listener rule maps a path, hostname or both to a particular target group. Since we use an ECS service, we can
assign a particular service to a target group. The service then manages which ports and EC2 instances are part of the
target group.
While the ALB can enforce encryption from the end user to the ALB, the container application (e.g., Jupyter) should
also be configured to listen only for HTTPS. In this manner, the communication from the end user to the ALB is
encrypted as is the communication from the ALB to the container application, ensuring end to end encryption.
Furthermore the application load balancer is also configured to perform authentication from an OpenID Con-
nect (OIDC) compliant IDP. This eliminates the need for multiple messages to be passed when using ei-
ther SAML or OAuth. Upon authentication, the ALB attaches three fields to the header of the http request
x-amzn-oidc-accesstoken, x-amzn-oidc-identity and x-amzn-oidc-data which can be used by
the end application to confirm the user’s identity and validate the authentication. An example of this process as imple-
mented in a Jupyter notebook is described below.
For our IDP, we use Okta since it allows us to federate identity services to additional sign on services. This allows us
to onboard collaborators and allow the collaborators to manage their users.
Shared Storage In order to facilitate persistence across containers and also collaboration, ECS orchestrates contain-
ers on EC2 instances instead of AWS’s Fargate product (Fargate facilitates containers in a serverless fashion but does
not provide a host to mount an ObjectiveFS file system). Persistent storage can be mounted on the underlying EC2
instances. Individual containers can access the persistent storage by bind mounting the persistent storage. To meet
security compliance of encryption at rest, the persistent storage should be encrypted. We elected to use the third party
ObjectiveFS for cost reasons though native AWS resources such as elastic file system (EFS) can be used provided that
both the file system and the network communications to the file system are encrypted. [Ser20c] ObjectiveFS is a secure
file system backed by AWS simple storage service (S3). It should be noted to meet encryption in transit compliance
requirements that any network attached storage must have network communications encrypted. For example, the base
network file system (nfs) protocol is not.
As a specific example with Jupyter notebooks we mount persistent storage as /media/home/. For a given user
say user_a we bind mount /home/jovyan to /media/home/user_a so that while in the container the user
sees /home/jovyan the home directory the users files are actually stored in the persistent storage in a user_a
subdirectory. This configuration has two advantages. Only one persistent volume is needed to support all users’ home
directories minimizing costs and within the container all users see /home/jovyan thus eliminating the need to build a
separate Jupyter container image for each user.
With this configuration, multiple services can use the same home directory. For example, in our R Studio
deployment /home/rstudio is also mapped to /media/home/user_a. Furthermore, we also can pro-
vide a persistent volume for shared directories. For example, for all users on project_a we bind mount
/home/jovyan/projects/project_a to /media/projects/project_a where the persistent volume
is mounted to /media/projects.
Resource Summary To securely implement the above cloud architecture, each container instance for each user has a
set of resources associated with it. First, a task definition is created for each user, this enables customized bind mounts
as described above. Additionally, custom environment variables or task commands can also be supplied through the
task definition. The task definition can also direct logging the the appropriate AWS CloudWatch stream.
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Figure 2: Cloud Architecture.
Each user also has a ECS service, ALB listener rule and target group associated with it. This allows the seamless
management of connecting a user to the desired container instance.
Finally each service has an AWS IAM role associated with it, this ensures the user has only the access rights to our
AWS cloud that are need by the user. Beyond the rights to operate the container task, additional rights might include
access to certain S3 storage or certain AWS Secrets Manager. As an example, we use the AWS Secrets Manager to
manage user’s credentials to various databases and public/private keys.
To simplify management of the per user resources, an AWS CloudFormation template is used to ensure consistency and
uniformity among cloud resources whenever a new container instance/user combination is spun up. As an example,
our CloudFormation template contains an IAM role, listener rule, target group, task definition, and an ECS service.
Each template is then customized to spin up a CloudFormation stack for each user and application combination.
Container Architecture
The architecture in terms of container comprises a persistent hub container, an optional ephemeral provisioner con-
tainer, and an assortment of semi-persistent application containers such as Jupyter notebook. In an alternative deploy-
ment, AWS Lambda functions can be functionally substituted for the hub container, but for the sake of simplicity only
the container version of the hub is described.
The application containers are described as semi-persistent as they can be started on demand and culled when one or
more inactivity criteria has been reached. This can be achieved by updating the associated service to have a desired
count of 1 to start or a desired count of 0 to cull.
We adopted a url path routing convention to access each application such as
domain.com/user_id/application
Container Management The heart of the system is the hub container. To facilitate ALB authentication, two listener
rules are provided. One rule allows anyone to connect, so that the hub can present a login page (with single sign on and
IDP this looks like a single login button). The login action redirects the browser to a url which forces authentication
via the ALB. Though this step is not necessary, it provides a cue that makes for a smoother user experience.
4
A PREPRINT - JUNE 3, 2020
Since the hub container may be given privileges to set IAM roles for the application services, the role under which
the hub service runs can have a boundary policy attached to it [Ser20d]. This ensures that any role created by the hub
service is constrained to include the boundary policy. This prevents the hub from being able to create an arbitrary role
should the container become compromised.
The provisioner container is an ephemeral task which is run with the persistent storage mounted. The provisioner can
create a home directory for a user the first time the user logs in and provision the directory with any necessary files.
While the functionality of the provisioner container could be incorporated in the hub container. Separation allows the
provisioner to run with minimal cloud privileges (IAM role) and allows the hub to have no access to the shared home
directory, so in the event the hub container is compromised the user’s file system is not exposed. Also, with separation
the hub does not have to have access to the file system so it can be refactored and deployed as a Lambda function.
Furthermore the provisioner container runs very briefly further limiting the vulnerability window.
Once authenticated, the user can elect to connect to an application container. This can occur under three circumstances:
the user’s application container is still running, the user’s application container has been culled, or the user has never
started the application before. If the container is still running, the user is immediately redirected to the container. If
the container has been culled, the service is updated to a desired count of 1. If the application has never been started
by the user, resources to spin up the service are created such as by creating a CloudFormation stack.
Additionally, an option to "decommission" an application can be presented where the CloudFormation stack can be
deleted.
Culling The best practice for culling an application is to have the application upon exiting, set the desired count to
0 of its corresponding service.
For the example of Jupyter, the start up scripts for both Jupyter notebook and Jupyter lab contains the following snippet
with main imported from different places:
if __name__ == '__main__':
sys.argv[0] = re.sub(r'(-script\.pyw?|\.exe)?$',
'', sys.argv[0])
sys.exit(main())
Rather than just exiting after main completes, a modified start up script updates the desired count of the corresponding
service to 0. Since boto3 essentially wraps API calls to AWS, a delay before termination is needed to ensure the
update API call is received before terminating the task. Failure to change the desired count will only result in the
service restarting the container upon termination.
if __name__ == '__main__':
sys.argv[0] = re.sub(r'(-script\.pyw?|\.exe)?$',
'', sys.argv[0])
main()
session = boto3.Session()
ecs = session.client("ecs", region_name)
ecs.update_service(cluster=cluster_name,
service=service_name,
desiredCount=0)
# Sleep for 2 minutes give service time to update
time.sleep(120)
Code to retrieve the region_name, cluster_name, and service_name, are omitted for clarity, but they can
be retrieved from environment variables (set in task definition), passed via sys.argv or even by calls to boto3.
Though the first two options are simpler.
The above modification to the start up scripts ensures that when Jupyter exits the task
count is zero. However, in order for this to be meaningful culling parameters in the
Jupyter configuration such as c.NotebookApp.shutdown_no_activity_timeout
c.MappingKernelManager.cull_connected, c.MappingKernelManager.cull_idle_timeout
and c.MappingKernelManager.cull_interval, as well as setting a shell timeout (e.g., TMOUT environment
variable are set) in the event a terminal is open.
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Authentication and Applications
As mentioned above, the bulk of the authentication is performed by the ALB. However, it is important for the indi-
vidual application to validate a request forwarded by the ALB, for two reasons. Validation prevents potential security
vulnerablities due to a misconfiguration in the system or exposes security vulnerabilities during the initial system de-
bugging. Additionally, validation ensures that the identity of the user is what is expected. The ALB ensures that the
user has validly authenticated, but it is up to the application to ensure that the correct user has connected.
Validation is achieved through the JWT token presented in the x-amzn-oidc-data header by the ALB. These JWT
tokens are signed by a public key retrievable from AWS ensuring that only the ALB could have signed them. Within
the JWT token, the kid field represents the key ID for the public key. To validate, the key ID should be extracted and
corresponding public key should be retrieved from AWS. With the public key, the JWT token can then be validated.
We use the python-jose module available on PyPi. The sub field in the JWT token is the same as the OIDC ID
which is also presented in the x-amzn-oidc-identity field. The application should then verify this is OIDC ID
associated with the expected user.
To deploy an application securely in our infrastructure, in addition to validating the authentication, the application
container should meet four more requirements. It should have a configurable base url as the ALB will forward requests
to the application with the base url prefix. It should communicate to the ALB over HTTPS to ensure end to end
encryption. It should provide a url to respond to pings sent by the ALB for health checks. It should validate that the
mounted home container belongs to the user.
The solution to the last requirement is for our provisioner to write an .id file in the user’s home directory containing
the user’s ID. This file is written by root and is only readable. The application upon startup or authenticaation can
verify that the user has the correct home directory mounted. This requirement is a safeguard against misconfiguration
and can be omitted if one is confident that the system is not misconfigured.
Jupyter
Unfortunately, unlike JupyterHub, Jupyter notebook/lab do not come with a pluggable authentication module.
In order to implement validation, the source file login.py must be modified. This file is usually located
in the notebook/auth/ directory in your site-packages or dist-packages directory. Since Jupyter
notebook and JupyterLab are not truly separate applications (in fact they are interchangeable using the path
/tree or /lab), the same login.py file facilitates authentication for both. If you build using a standard
docker image such as jupyter/base-notebook or any of its derivative notebooks, this directory would be
/opt/conda/lib/python3.x/site-packages directory. Please note that the specific python version may
vary dependent on which version of the docker container is used and whether subsequent additional install modules
might force a rollback of python versions.
The specific modification to the login.py file involves replacing two methods, the get method and the
get_user_token class method of the LoginHandler class.
Unaltered, the method get determines whether the current_user is set indicating the user has been logged in.
If not authenticated, the function presents a login page. Our modification simply adds an additional check that if
current_user is not set, we validate the JWT token in header to determine additionally whether the user is authen-
ticated. It should also be noted that the function is also decorated as a coroutine to make the function asynchronous as
the verification may require network access to retrieve a public key.
@tornado.gen.coroutine
def get(self):
authenticated = False
if self.current_user:
authenticated = True
else:
if self.verify_jwt():
authenticated=True
if authenticated:
next_url = self.get_argument('next',
default=self.base_url)
self._redirect_safe(next_url)
else:
self._render()
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The other method to be replaced is the get_user_token. Unaltered, the method returns the authorization token
used as part of a notebook/lab minimal authentication scheme. This token is normally supplied as a query string in the
URL or through the login page. We bypass this mechanism altogether. Instead, we examine the request header for a
JWT token supplied by AWS and validate it. If it is successful we provide a token. As far as the rest of the notebook
code the value of the token is not used so we supply a random string. Our version of get_user_token uses a local
cache to store retrieved public keys and previously the previously decoded user ID.
@classmethod
def get_user_token(cls, handler):
"""Identify the user based on
Authorization header
Returns:
- uuid if authenticated
- None if not
"""
authenticated = False
if cls.verify_oidc(handler):
authenticated = True
else:
oidc_jwt = handler.request.headers\
.get('x-amzn-oidc-data')
if oidc_jwt:
try:
header = jwt.get_unverified_headers( \
oidc_jwt)
except JOSEError:
return None
kid = header.get('kid')
if kid and kid == user_cache.get('kid') \
and user_cache.get('pk'):
try:
token = jwt.decode(oidc_jwt,
user_cache['pk'])
except JOSEError:
return None
oidc_id = handler.request.headers\
.get('x-amzn-oidc-identity')
if token['sub'] == oidc_id:
authenticated = True
user_cache['jwt'] = oidc_jwt
user_cache['user_id'] = oidc_id
if authenticated:
return uuid.uuid4().hex
else:
return None
In addition to the two modified methods, we supply two helper methods verify_jwt for get and verify_oidc
for get_user_token. They perform the token validation and cache management. Additional code which can read
identifiers in persistent volumes and verify they match the user who is authenticated can also be added to ensure two
authenticated users don’t have access to the other’s containers.
def verify_jwt(self):
global user_cache
oidc_id = self.request.headers\
.get('x-amzn-oidc-identity')
oidc_jwt = self.request.headers\
.get('x-amzn-oidc-data')
if not oidc_jwt:
self.log.warning("No JWT Token in Header")
return False
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if (user_cache.get('user_id') == oidc_id and \
user_cache.get('jwt') == oidc_jwt):
return True
try:
header = jwt.get_unverified_headers(oidc_jwt)
except JOSEError as e:
self.log.error("JWT failed to decode: {}"\
.format(e))
return False
kid = header.get('kid')
if not kid:
self.log.error("No Key ID in JWT token")
return False
if kid != user_cache.get('kid'):
if 'pk' in user_cache:
del user_cache['pk']
if not 'pk' in user_cache:
try:
r = requests.get(PK_SERVER + kid)
# TODO treat return code
user_cache['pk'] = r.text
user_cache['kid'] = kid
except requests.RequestException as e:
self.log.error("Requests Error: {}"\
.format(e))
return False
try:
token = jwt.decode(oidc_jwt,
user_cache['pk'])
except JOSEError as e:
self.log.info("JWT failed to validate: {}"\
.format(e))
return False
if token['sub'] != oidc_id:
self.log.error("User ID in token doesn't "
"match user ID in header")
return False
user_cache['user_id'] = oidc_id
user_cache['jwt'] = oidc_jwt
@classmethod
def verify_oidc(cls, handler):
global user_cache
oidc_id = handler.request.headers\
.get('x-amzn-oidc-identity')
oidc_jwt = handler.request.headers\
.get('x-amzn-oidc-data')
if not oidc_id or not oidc_jwt:
return False
if oidc_id != user_cache.get('user_id'):
return False
if oidc_jwt != user_cache.get('jwt'):
return False
try:
header = jwt.get_unverified_headers(oidc_jwt)
except JOSEError:
return False
8
A PREPRINT - JUNE 3, 2020
proxy
RStudio
server
app/ping
/use
r_id/
rstud
io/au
th-si
gn-in
/user_id/rstudio
Figure 3: Inside the RStudio Container
kid = header.get('kid')
if kid != user_cache.get('kid'):
return False
return True
To meet the other requirements for Jupyter, the base_url configuration needs to be set to ensure that the route is
properly interpreted. Furthermore, we use this base_url as the health check url which responds with a 302 code. A
self-signed certificate is automatically generated when the container starts and that certificate is then used to configure
Jupyter to run over HTTPS.
RStudio
Our implementation of RStudio Server on the same cloud platform is non-invasive to the code base, but more com-
plicated architecturally. Since RStudio does not have a way to set the base URL of the application, a proxy is re-
quired to rewrite the HTTPS request paths. We use an nginx proxy to rewrite requests to RStudio Server using the
proxy_redirect directive.
Figure shows the application structure within the RStudio container. A proxy communicates with the ALB and routes
some requests to a custom app used for authentication and handling the health checks and others to the RStudio server.
Since communications between the proxy, app and RStudio server are all within the container and not exposed, they
do not require encryption to satisfy compliance. A self-signed certificate is created upon container startup that enables
nginx to communicate over HTTPS to the ALB.
For authentication, RStudio Server maintains authentication session information in a cookie. So with nginx we
capture, the auth-sign-in URL and redirect it to an lightweight webapp whose sole function is to authenticate the
user, set the cookie and redirect the browser to RStudio Server. Since the app is necessary in this configuration, we
also configure the app to respond to a /ping request issued by the ALB target group’s health check.
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The authentication code is nearly identical to the verify_jwt function written above for Jupyter. The cookie con-
sists of three pieces, a user ID (which we retain as the default rstudio as we retained jovyan for the Jupyter
notebook, to prevent the need to build a separate docker image for each user), the expiry and an HMAC 256 signa-
ture, signed with a secret typically stored at /var/lib/rstudio-server/secure-cookie-key inside the
container. The following snippet of code implements this.
from urllib.parse import quote
from Crypto.Hash import HMAC
from Crypto.Hash import SHA256
import base64
import datetime
utc = datetime.datetime.utcnow()
expiry = utc + datetime.timedelta(days)
now = expiry.strftime('%a, %d %b %Y %H:%M:%S GMT')
dig = base64.b64encode( \
HMAC.new(secret,
"{0}{1}".format(username, now),
digestmod=SHA256).digest())
cookie = quote("{0}|{1}|{2}".format(username,
now,
dig.decode()),
'|')
response.set_cookie('user-id', cookie)
The days is the number of days til the cookie expires, and username is the user name (i.e. rstudio). In the above
snippet, the cookie is attacked to a Flask response.
Virtual Network Computing (VNC) Containers
There are many desktop apps for Linux which may also be useful to deploy via a web application on a cloud cluster
such as presented here. The following implementation allows the deployment of such applications such as Orange and
Falcon through the use of a web VNC client to a VNC server running in a container.
This is based on the Docker Headless VNC Container project [Con19] as a blueprint using the xfce4 window man-
ager. Since it appears that the project has been inactive for over a year we adopt its Dockerfile as a starting point
but do not use the docker images as a building block.
Figure 4 shows the application structure within a headless VNC container. NoVNC [noV20] is used as a web to
vnc proxy which connects via VNC to a local vnc server which in accordance to the Docker Headless VNC Con-
tainer project is tigerVNC [Tig20]. Through the VNC server graphically oriented operating system commands and
applications can be executed. In our container tigerVNC is unchanged and is installed just as it is in the headerless
project’s Dockerfile. The noVNC project comprises a novnc and websockify component. No changes were
made to the novnc component except to alter the parameters use to start websockify. Therefore the focus of the
customization is on the websockify component.
Fortunately, websockify permits authentication plugins. The plugin is a simple class with an authenticate
method which accepts the headers, target_host and target_port as parameters. Upon success it returns
and on failure it raises an AuthenticationError exception. Since the body of the code is essentially the same
as the verify_jwt method descirbed for Jupyter, the code is not repeated here.
It should be noted that in the container by default the VNC server listens on port 5901 and the novnc client listens on
port 6901. It is recommended that only port 6901 be exposed so that only the novnc client can directly communicate
with the VNC server as the VNC password in this environment is not well protected. By only exposing port 6901,
knowledge of the VNC password can not be exploited to bypass the authentication.
Furthermore, the web server within the websockify project is located in websockifyserver.py and is based
on SimpleHTTPServer. It may be desirable to create a custom handler or custom do_GETmethod to handle issues
such as providing a base URL, health check URL for the ALB’s target group, or to implement templating if desired.
A self-signed certificate is generated in a launch.sh as self.pem which the webserver will automatically detect and run
using HTTPS.
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Once this base container image is built with those customizations. Applications such as Orange or Falcon can be
added, thus not limiting the cloud system to web applications.
Custom Applications
In developing your own bespoke applications, a layer of authentication can be employed. In consideration of develop-
ing or adapting your own application, you should provide an unauthenticated URL for the ALB’s health check and be
equipped to configure the base URL. Authentication can be easily plugged into most web server frameworks.
As a simple example, using flask authentication can be incorporated into a custom login_required decorator, so
that for any protected URL the request is authenticated before being processed. Once again the decorator could be
implemented with code similar to that of jwt_verify described above.
Security and Compliance
In our cloud architecture, the bulk of the security and compliance is built into the EC2 instances serving as nodes
behind the ALB and built into features of the ALB. By keeping most of the security external to the containers, container
images need less customization for security purposes making it easier to support a wide variety of container images
and container apps.
The preferred method to implement security, compliance, and even maintenance services on an EC2 instance is to
install the appropriate software in an Amazon machine image (AMI). By building a customized AMI based off an op-
timized Amazon ECS reference AMI [Ser20b] but including the desired additional services installed, an fully equipped
EC2 instance can be spun up quickly and features such as autoscaling can easily be applied.
Specifics to security and compliance implementations are described in the following subsections including encryption
at rest, access controls, auditing and other agents.
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Encryption at Rest
As previoiusly mentioned, persistent storage and associated file system protocol are encrypted give both encryption in
transit and encryption at rest for the persistent storage. However, it is also important that the base file system of the EC2
instances are also encrypted to fully ensure encryption at rest. There are two important aspects of ensuring encryption
at rest for the base file system. First the attached file system such as elastic block storage (EBS) must be encrypted. This
is accomplished by selecting encryption when creating the EC2 instance or within a launch configuration. Fortunately,
AWS now offers an account-level option where EBS volumes are encrypted by default for any EBS volumes created
in that given account. We highly recommend this option as it will mitigate the chances of misconfiguration.
Furthermore, the AMI used to create EC2 instances must also be encrypted. A common technique for doing so is
to build an machine snapshot will all the agents and services desired then encrypt the snapshot. Regardless for what
techinque is used. the AMI’s should be encrypted to satisfy any requirements for encryption at rest.
Access Control
Another security concern is controlling the internet access from the container. The reason is two fold. First, controlling
access allows us to prevent users from within a container from accessing potentially malicious websites. Second,
should a container become compromised we want to mitigate the compromised container’s ability to escalate privileges
or pivot to other services within the organization. While AWS through the use of security groups and access control
lists provide a coarse ability to regulate what destinations are accessible, we favor more fine grain control.
There are two aspects of this finer grain control, first we use an on-host firewall to control outbound access from the
hosted containers. Second we funnel all traffic from each container to a proxy.
For the firewall, we use iptables using the following commands:
iptables --insert DOCKER-USER --in-interface docker0 \
-o eth0 -j DROP
iptables --insert DOCKER-USER \
--destination 169.254.169.254 --jump REJECT \
--reject-with icmp-port-unreachable
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i docker0 \
-d 172.17.0.1 -p tcp --dport 8888 -j RETURN
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i docker0 \
-d 172.17.0.1 -p tcp -j DNAT --to-destination :2
The first command blocks all internet traffic coming from the docker0 interface (where the containers must route
through) to the eth0 interface which is the external interface. The second command (see [Cos18]) blocks access to
the node specific metadata service, which typical contains information about the EC2 instance and credentials for that
instance.d. Blocking this prevents a compromised container from accessing the metadata about the EC2 instances
blocking a potential escalation in privliges to that of the EC2 node. The third and fourth commands allows the
container access to the EC2 instance (which in the docker world is IP address 172.17.0.1) only on port 8888,
where the proxy is configured to listen. All other access is routed to port 2 which has no active listeners.
On the container side, the environment variables http_proxy and https_proxy must be set to forward all http
and https request to the EC2 instance at port 8888. In addition the no_proxy environment variable should be
set to allow some traffic not to be forced into the proxy. Of course, localhost (and corresponding IP address
127.0.0.1) do not require proxy as the traffic doesn’t leave the container. In addition, the metadata IP address
169.254.169.254 should be allowed out so that the iptables rule regarding the metadata traffic can be en-
forced. Finally, the IP address 169.254.169.2 is used by the ECS agent.
Two methods can be used to address the environment variables. Either we can add the environment variables to the
task definition when an application service created or it can defined in the container’s Dockerfile with the following
lines:
ENV http_proxy= width0pthttp://172.17.0.1:8888/
ENV https_proxy= width0pthttp://172.17.0.1:8888/
ENV no_proxy=localhost,127.0.0.1,\
169.254.169.254,169.254.170.2
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Because of the iptables rules a misconfiguration that fails to set the proper environment variables results in loss of
access and not a vulnerability.
The proxy can then determine whether to route the connection request directly externally or through an external
outbound gateway which could include a company firewall so that broad based policies could be applied. For the
proxy we selected tinyproxy because it is lightweight and allows gateway credentials to be embedded in the proxy
configuration pushing the burden of gateway credentials to the proxy and not the container or application of the
container.
Auditing
Beyond security reasons, many regulations such as HIPAA require auditing for compliance. Our approach is two fold.
We use the ALB logging capabilities to track access to application containers and authentication. We use a logging
agent to track potential privlege escalation or other security concerns on the underlying EC2 host.
The ALB provides logging [Ser20a] which will log all access to the application containers to an S3 bucket. Because
in our architecture all authentication is performed using the ALB all authentication attempts both successful and more
importantly failures are also logged to the bucket. Many third party log management tools are configurable to digest
logs stored in this manner including Loggly, Splunk, Sumo Logic.
Another good practice is to set the target S3 bucket in a separate AWS account and only grant privleges to the logging
account to write to the bucket but not delete. This ensure that even if a container or the EC2 instance is compromised,
the logs can not be tampered with.
To supplement the auditing and monitoring capability one or more logging agents are installed on the EC2 instance.
Essentially, this agent transmits logs of interest such as the system log syslog to an external log management system.
Through this mechanism behaviours such as privlege escalation (e.g. sudo) are tracked. We use both the native AWS
logging agent and a third party logging agent.
With both mechanisms in place, the preferred log management system can be configured to provide alarms when
severe incidents occurs and generate reports of incidents as may be required by compliance requirements.
Other Useful Agents
Building a custom AMI image to spin up an EC2 instance to support our ECS cluster affords the opportunity to
install additional agents to meet security, compliance and maintenance needs. Our best practices is to the include the
following additional agents in the AMI. Some of agents are provided by AWS while some are third party.
ECS Agent The AWS ECS agent is required in order for the EC2 instance to serve ECS containers. However,
periodically updating the ECS agent is important in that potential vulnerabilites may be fixed and newer agents offer
more features to aid in maintenance. Furthermore, proper configuration of features can aid in security as well. For
example, the ECS agent can be configure so that the maximum lifetime of an EC2 instance is set. This is particularly
useful if the AMIs for the EC2 instances are constantly being updated with security patches etc. The limited lifetime
guarantees that the EC2 instances running will not be based on an AMI that is too out of date.
Systems Manager Agent Another useful AWS Agent that can be employed is the AWS Systems Manager Agent
(SSM) [Ser20e]. The SSM agent allows the “Systems Manager to update, manage and configure” the EC2 instances.
This agent makes it easier to maintain EC2 instances in a centralized manner. Once again keeping an EC2 instance up
to date helps reduce vulnerabilites on the node.
Anti-virus An antivirus or antimalware agent is also recommended. The antivirus should be one that is container
aware and that the container awareness feature should be active. This would facilitate pinpointing the specific container
that may be compromised. Container systems such as docker are not complete virtualizations. Processes that run in a
container run as processes in the native host, as such an antivirus agent inside can monitor processes that occur “inside
a container”. Container aware antivirus agents makes mitigation in a container environment easier. In our particular
configuration, we use Sophos as the antivirus but you may have your own preferences.
Intrusion Detection Another useful agent to be deployed on the EC2 instance is an intrusion detection agent. Like
this antivirus agent, an intrusion detection agent that has container awareness capabilities is desireable and should
have the capability activated. The intrusion detection agent looks for activities that are anomolous and when high
risk activity is detected, it will gather as much information around the incident as it can. We use ThreatStack for our
intrusion detection.
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Conclusion
Presented here is a secure, collaborative infrastructure for deploying a cloud computation resources. The primary
purpose of our infrastructure is to provide Jupyter in this environment though due to the preference of some of our
users RStudio and other tools are include. Our Data Science and infrastructure team is small so building a compliant
infrastructure that requires little maintenance is paramount. Equally important is to safeguard against opening vulner-
abilities due to misconfigurations. By following the suggestions presented here, misconfigurations err on the side of
loss of functionality rather than introducing vulnerabilites.
The architecture presented here was successful in a recently performed penetration test. While the recommendations
and architecture shown here rely heavily on AWS resources. No doubt elements and counterparts can be found in
other cloud services such as Google Cloud and Microsoft Azure.
Snippets of code, Dockerfile, commands and other resources presented here and the corresponding poster are available
at West Health’s github repository at https://github.com/Westhealth/scipy2020/cloud_infrastructure.
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